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Abstract
Smart card based remote user password authentication schemes are one of the
user-friendly and scalable mechanism to establish secure communication between
remote entities. These schemes try to ensure secure and authorized communication
between remote entities over the insecure public network. Although, most of the
existing schemes do not satisfy desirable attributes, such that resistance against
attacks, user anonymity and efficiency. In 2012, Chen et al. proposed a robust
smart cased based remote user authentication scheme to erase the weaknesses of
Sood et al.’s scheme. Recently, Jiang et al. showed that Chen et al.’s scheme
is vulnerable to password guessing attack. Furthermore, Jiang et al. presented a
solution to overcome the shortcoming of Chen et al.’s scheme. In the paper, we show
that Jiang et al.’s scheme is still vulnerable to insider attack, on-line and off-line
password guessing attack and user impersonation attack. Their scheme also fails to
ensure perfect forward secrecy and user’s anonymity. Moreover, It does not provide
efficient login and user-friendly password change phase. Further, to overcome these
drawbacks, we present a modify scheme which reduces the computation overhead
and satisfies all desirable security attributes where Jiang et al.’s scheme failed.
keywords: Smart card; Password based authentication; Cryptanalysis; Anonymity.
1 Introduction
The advancements in technology have made the Internet an efficient and scalable tool to
utilize for various online services. However, an adversary may have full control over the
network and can perform various kinds of attacks. Therefore, to ensure authorized and
secure communication, user and server should mutually authenticate each other and draw
a session key. The smart card based authentication protocols are designed and developed
to ensure secure and authorized communication between remote user and server [5].
In 2009, Xu et al. [16] presented an improved smart card based password authentication
scheme to overcome the weaknesses of Lee et al.’s scheme [7]. Xu et al. also claimed that
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their scheme satisfies all the desirable security attributes. Although, in 2010, Sood et
al. [14] showed that Xu et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to offline password-guessing attack
and forgery attacks. They also presented an improvement of Xu et al.’s scheme. In the
same year, Song [13] also demonstrated that an adversary can retrieve the stored infor-
mation from the smart card and can perform user impersonation attack. Further, he
presented an enhanced authentication scheme using smart card to overcome the weak-
nesses of Xu et al.’s scheme. In 2012, Chen et al. [1] pointed out that the improvements
presented by both Song and Sood et al. are still vulnerable to known attacks. Chen et al.
showed that Sood et al.’s scheme does not achieve mutual authentication as it supports
only one way authentication where only server verifies the user’s authenticity. In addi-
tion, they identified the inefficiency of Sood et al.’s scheme in the detection of incorrect
input. Chen et al. also demonstrated the offline password guessing attack on the Song’s
scheme. Moreover, they proposed an efficient authentication scheme. Recently, Jiang
et al. [3] analyzed Chen et al.’s scheme and showed that Chen et al.’s scheme does not
resist password guessing attack. They also proposed a solution to erase the drawback of
password guessing attack. Unfortunately, Jiang et al.’s scheme does not erase password
guessing attack efficiently and it is still vulnerable to off-line and on-line password guess-
ing attack. It does not resist insider attack and user impersonation attack. Additionally,
it does not support session key verification which helps to enhance data security and
integrity.
An adversary can eavesdrop the user and the server interaction as they communicate via
public channel. Therefore, secrecy of a consumer’s identity should be supported during
message exchange. Otherwise, it may give an opportunity to the adversary to collect the
users specific information that enables him to track the consumer’s current location and
login history. Unfortunately, none of the aforementioned password based authentication
schemes [16, 7, 8, 14, 13, 1, 3] protect anonymity. Additionally, a user should allow to
recover his lost smart card. Although these schemes do not present smart card revocation
phase where an authorized user can recover his lost smart card with the help of server.
In this article, we present a brief review of Jiang et al.’s scheme and demonstrate the
vulnerability of their scheme to off-line and on-line password guessing attack, insider
attack and user impersonation attack. We point out inefficiency of Jiang et al.’s scheme
to protect user anonymity and to present user-friendly password change phase and ineffi-
cient login phase. Further, we proposed an enhanced password based authenticated key
agreement scheme using smart card to overcome the weaknesses of Jiang et al.’s scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the brief review of Jiang
et al.’s scheme. Section 3 points out the weakness of Jiang et al.’s scheme. Finally,
conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
2 Review of Jiang et al.’s Scheme
In 2013, Jiang et al. [3] proposed an improvement of Chen et al.’s [1] remote user’s au-
thentication scheme. Their scheme, registration and password change phases are similar
to Chen et al.’s scheme. However the login & authentication phase are different to over-
come the weaknesses of Chen et al.’s scheme. This schemes has the following four phases:
1. Registration phase
2. Login phase
3. Authentication phase
4. Password change phase
In the beginning of the system, the server chooses two large prime numbers p and q such
that p = 2q+ 1. It also selects the master secret key x ∈ Zq and a one way hash function
h(·) : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p . Then, the registration, login and authentication phases execute as
follows:
2.1 Registration Phase
To achieve a valid smart card, a user proceeds as follows:
Step 1. Ui chooses a unique identity IDi and password PWi. Then, he submits IDi
and PWi to S via a secure channel.
Step 2. S computes Bi = h(IDi)
(x+PWi) (mod p).
Step 3. S embeds the parameters {Bi, h(·), p, q} into the smart card and issues to Ui.
It also stores IDi in its ID table.
2.2 Login Phase
Step 1. Ui enters his smart card into the card reader and inputs IDi and PWi.
Step 2. The smart card selects a random number α ∈ Z∗q and calculates the following
values at time Ti:
Ci = Bi/h(IDi)
PWi (mod p)
Di = h(IDi)
α (mod p)
Wi = (Ci)
α (mod p)
Mi = h(IDi ‖ Ci ‖ Di ‖ Wi ‖ Ti)
Then, it sends the message {IDi, Di,Mi, Ti} to S.
2.3 Authentication Phase
Step 1. When S receives the message at time T
′
i , it verifies the existence of IDi in
its database. If IDi exists, then verifies T
′
U − TU ≤ 4T , where 4T is the valid
time delay in message transmission. If conditions does not hold, it terminates the
session. Otherwise, it computes the following values:
C ′i = h(IDi)
x (mod p)
W ′i = (D
′
i)
x (mod p)
M ′i = h(IDi ‖ C ′i ‖ Di ‖ W ′i ‖ Ti)
Step 2. S verifies M
′
i =? Mi. If verification does not hold, it rejects the request. Oth-
erwise, Ui is authenticated by S.
Step 3. S takes the current timestamp TS and computes MS = h(IDi ‖ W ′i ‖ TS), then
transmits the message {IDi,MS, TS} to Ui.
Step 4. Upon receiving the message at time T
′
S, Ui validates T
′
S − TS ≤ 4T . If verifica-
tion succeeds, Ui verifies MS =? h(IDi ‖ Wi ‖ TS).
Step 5. Ui and S computes their respective session keys SK = h(Wi) = h(W
′
i ).
2.4 Password Change Phase
A user can change his password as follows:
Step 1. Ui enters the smart card into a card reader, then inputs identity IDi, old pass-
word PWi and new password PWnew.
Step 2. The smart card interacts with the server S to confirm the correctness of old
password PWi by executing login and authentication phase. If old password veri-
fication holds, the smart card computes
Bnew = Bi · h(IDi)PWnew/h(IDi)PWi (mod p).
Step 3. Finally, the smart card replaces Bi with B
new
U .
3 Cryptanalysis of Jiang et al.’s Scheme
In this section, we will discuss the flaws of Jiang et al’s scheme. After analysis, we find
that their scheme cannot resist some of the known attacks such as insider, password
guessing attack and user impersonation attack.
3.1 User anonymity
The leakage of the user’s specific information enables the adversary to track the user’s
current location and login history [4]. Although user’s anonymity ensures user’s privacy
by preventing an attacker from acquiring user’s sensitive personal information. Moreover,
anonymity makes remote user authentication mechanism more robust as an attacker could
not track which users are interacting with the server.
The straightforward way to preserve anonymity is to conceal user’s real identity during
communication. However, Jiang et al.’s scheme takes user’s real identity in login message.
It shows that Jiang et al.’s scheme does not protect anonymity.
3.2 Insider Attack:
In general, a user uses the same password for several accounts because it is difficult
to remember several distinct passwords for different accounts. When a user submits
his password in its original form to the server, a malicious insider can know the user’s
password. This gives the opportunity to a malicious insider to access user’s accounts
which are protected with the same passwords. Unfortunately, Jiang et al.’s scheme does
not prevent insider attack as user submits its original password to the server.
3.3 On-line password guessing attack
In Jiang et al.’s scheme, the server does not track the login requests, that is, server does
not count the unsuccessful login request. It provides an opportunity to an adversary
to perform online password guessing attack as server does not deny incorrect repeated
login request. An adversary can successfully perform on-line password guessing attack
as follows:
Step 1. Adversary could achieve stored secret information < Bi, h(·), p, q > from the
lost smart card. Moreover, he can intercept the user login message {IDi, Di,Mi, Ti}
and achieve user’s identity IDi.
Step 2. The adversary guesses the password PW ∗i and selects a value e, then computes
the following values:
C∗i = Bi/h(IDi)
PW ∗i (mod p)
DE = h(IDi)
e (mod p)
WE = (C
∗
i )
e (mod p)
ME = h(IDi ‖ C∗i ‖ DE ‖ W ∗i ‖ TE)
Then, the adversary sends the message {IDi, DE,ME, TE} to S.
Step 3. The verification of IDi and TE holds, as IDi is user’s identity and TE is fresh
timestamp used by adversary. Then, the server computes the following values:
Ci = h(IDi)
x (mod p)
W ∗i = (DE)
x (mod p)
Then, it verifies ME =?h(IDi ‖ C ′i ‖ DE ‖ W ′E ‖ Ti). If verification does not hold,
it rejects the request. Otherwise, responds with a valid message.
Step 4. If verification fails at server’s side, adversary repeats Step 2 and Step 3. Oth-
erwise, the password guessing attack will be succeeded.
3.4 Off-line password guessing attack
An adversary can guess a legitimate user’s password with the help of retrieve value Bi
and IDi from the stolen smart card SC{Bi, h(·), p, q} using power analysis attack [2, 6]
and intercepted login message < IDi, ai, ri >, respectively. An adversary can guess the
password as follows:
Step 1. An adversary intercepts the user’s login message < IDi, Di,Mi, Ti > and re-
trieves user’s identity IDi.
Step 2. In Jiang et al.’s scheme, the server does not verify the registration of identity,
that is, whether the identity submitted for registration is already registered or not.
It provides opportunity to an adversary to achieve user’s secret key h(IDi)
x using
user’s identity IDi as follows:
• E selects a random value PWE, then submits IDi and PWE to S.
• Upon receiving the request, S computes BE = h(IDi)(x+PWE) (mod p).
• S embeds the parameters {BE, h(·), p, q} into the smart card and provides it
to E.
• The adversary extracts BE from the smart card and computes user’s secret
key as follows:
h(IDi)
x = BE/h(IDi)
PWE (mod p)
Step 3. An attacker guesses the value PW ∗i and computes X
∗
i = Bi ⊕ h(IDi)PW ∗i , then
verifies X∗i =? h(IDi)
x.
Step 4. If the verification succeeds, considers PW ∗i as the user’s password. Otherwise,
he repeats Step 3.
3.5 User impersonation attack
An adversary can masquerade as a legitimate user by successfully login to the server as
follows:
• An adversary intercepts user’s login message {IDi, Di,Mi, Ti} and retrieves user’s
identity IDi from it.
• The adversary achieves user’s secret key h(IDi)x using user’s identity IDi as dis-
cussed in off-line password guessing attack.
• The adversary chooses a random number e ∈ Z∗q and computes the following values:
DE = h(IDi)
e (mod p)
WE = (h(IDi)
x)e (mod p)
ME = h(IDi ‖ h(IDi)x ‖ DE ‖ WE ‖ TE)
Then, he sends the message {IDi, DE,ME, TE} to S where TE is the current times-
tamp.
• When S receives the message at time T ′E, it verifies the IDi and T ′U − TU ≤ 4T .
Both the conditions hold as adversary uses registered user’s identity and current
timestamp. Then, S computes Ci = h(IDi)
x (mod p) and W ′E = (DE)
x (mod p),
and verifies
ME =? h(IDi ‖ Ci ‖ DE ‖ W ′E ‖ TE).
The verification holds as W ′E = (DE)
x (mod p) = h(IDi)
ex (mod p) = WE.
• Since, the verification holds, S authorized the message and computes MS = h(IDi ‖
W ′E ‖ TS) where TS is the current timestamp. It sends the message {IDi,MS, TS}
to Ui. S also computes the session key SK = h(W
′
E).
• E intercepts the message {IDi,MS, TS} and calculates the session key SK =
h(WE).
The discussion shows that an adversary can successfully login to the server and compute
the session key.
3.6 Time synchronization problem
To identify the replay attack, smart card based authentication schemes use timestamp
mechanism (T ′U − TU ≤ ∆T ), where TU is the time when the message is sent, T ′U is the
message receiving time and ∆T is the predetermined time delay in message transmission.
In general, a user device clock (local clock) may not synchronize with the server. So, if
the interval of time delay in message transmission ∆T is too small, the server may not
identify the valid message and deny legitimate request as it does not satisfy the condition.
Further, if the interval of the time delay in message transmission ∆T is too large, the
server may not identify the replay attack.
In jiang et al.’s scheme timestamp is used to resist replay attack. In general, all hardware
clocks are imperfect, local clock of user device may drift away from the server in time [12].
Therefore, the observed time or durations of the valid time intervals may differ for each
device in the network. If the clock on user device which is used for time stamping, is
differ by a significant amount, the valid login message {IDi, Di,Mi, Ti} does not pass the
condition T
′
U − TU ≤ 4T . It shows that a valid may fail to login to the server due to
time synchronization problem.
3.6.1 Perfect forward secrecy
In Jiang et al.’s scheme an adversary can compute the session key using compromised
master key x of the server as follows:
• To compute the session key SK = h(Wi), an adversary has to compute Wi = (Di)x
(mod p).
• An adversary can achieve Di = h(IDi)α (mod p) from {IDi, Di,Mi, Ti} as the
adversary can achieve old transmitted messages via public channel.
• An adversary can compute Wi = (Di)x (mod p) using compromised master key x.
Since, the compromise of master key may result compromise of session key, it shows that
proposed scheme does not ensure perfect forward secrecy.
3.7 Inefficient login phase
The smart card cannot verify the input in Jiang et al.’s scheme and executes the login
session in case of incorrect input. It shows the inefficiency of scheme in incorrect input
detection. It causes extra computation and communication overhead. If a user may input
incorrect password or identity due to mistake, then following cases arises:
Case 1: If a user inputs wrong password PW ∗i due to mistake.
• The smart card selects a random number α ∈ Z∗q and calculates the following values
at time Ti:
C∗i = Bi/h(IDi)
PW ∗i (mod p) 6= h(IDi)x (mod p) as PWi 6= PW ∗i
Di = h(IDi)
α (mod p)
W ∗i = (C
∗
i )
α (mod p)
M∗i = h(IDi ‖ C∗i ‖ Di ‖ W ∗i ‖ Ti)
Then, it sends the message {IDi, Di,Mi, Ti} to S.
• When S receives the message at time T ′i , it verifies the IDi existence in its database
and T
′
U − TU ≤ 4T . The verification holds as identity IDi is correct and smart
card uses current timestamp, then it computes the following values:
Ci = h(IDi)
x (mod p)
Wi = (Di)
x (mod p)
Mi = h(IDi ‖ Ci ‖ Di ‖ Wi ‖ Ti)
• When S verifies Mi =? M∗i . The verification does not hold as Wi 6= W ∗i , then
server rejects the request.
Case 2: If a user inputs incorrect identity ID∗i .
• The smart card selects a random number α ∈ Z∗q and calculates the following values
at time Ti:
C ′i
∗
= Bi/h(ID
∗
i )
PWi (mod p) 6= h(IDi)x (mod p) as IDi 6= ID∗i
D∗i = h(ID
∗
i )
α (mod p)
W ′i
∗
= (C ′i
∗
)α (mod p)
M ′i
∗
= h(ID∗i ‖ C ′i∗ ‖ D∗i ‖ W ′i ∗ ‖ Ti)
Then, it sends the message {ID∗i , D∗i ,M ′i∗, Ti} to S.
• When S receives the message at time T ′i , it verifies the existence of ID∗i in its
database. The verification does not hold as identity ID∗i is incorrect.
3.8 Unfriendly password change phase
To change the password of the smart card, a user has to establish an authorized session
with the server, that means, a user cannot change his password freely. This shows the
inefficiency of Jiang et al.’s scheme.
4 Proposed scheme
Jiang et al. tried to overcome the weaknesses of Chen et al.’s scheme by modifying
its login and authentication phase. Although, they failed to satisfy desirable security
attributes. To overcome the weaknesses of Jiang et al.’s scheme, we propose an improved
scheme which comprises the following phases:
(i) Initialization
(ii) Registration
(iii) Login
(iv) Authenticated key agreement
(v) Password change
(v) Smart card revocation
4.1 Initialization
In the beginning, server chooses two large prime numbers p and q such that p = 2q + 1.
It selects a secret key x ∈ Zq, say, master key. It also chooses a one way hash function
h(·) : {0, 1} → Z∗p , for example SHA-1.
4.2 Registration Phase
First, a non registered user submits his registration request along with identity and
password to the server. The user does not submit password in its original form, he
submits hashed output of the password to prevent insider attack. Upon receiving the
user’s request, the server verifies identity registration, that means, identity is already
registered or not. If identity is already registered with some other user, it asks for new
identity. Otherwise, it completes user’s registration and provides a smart card with
personalized parameters to the user. The detailed description of the procedure is as
follows:
Step 1. U selects a random number a and chooses an identity IDi and a password PWi
of his choice. He computes W = h(PWi ⊕ a) and submits (IDi,W ) with new user
registration request to S via secure channel.
Step 2. Upon receiving the U ’s registration request, S verifies credential of identity
IDi. If server found IDi in its database, that means, IDi is registered with some
other user, the server asks for the new identity. Otherwise, it computes Xi =
h(IDi||N ||IDSC ||x) and B = Xi ⊕W where IDSC is the issued smart card secret
identity, NID is a generated pseudonym identity and N = 0 if U is a new user,
otherwise N = N + 1.
Step 3. S personalizes the mart card by embedding the parameters {NID,B, h(·), p, q}
into the smart card. Then, it provides the smart card SC{NID,B, h(·), p, q} to
U via secure channel. Additionally, S maintains a database of registered users,
say, users’ record table. The entry N ||IDSC ||IDi is added corresponding to NID
into users’ record table. It also stores N corresponding to IDi in registered user’s
database.
Step 4. Upon receiving the smart card, U computes L = a ⊕ h(IDi ⊕ PWi) and V =
h(IDi||a||PWi). He stores L and V into the smart card. Finally, the smart card
stores the parameters {NID,B, L, V, h(·), p, q}.
Figure 1: The pictorial representation of registration phase
4.3 Login Phase
To established authorized session with the server, user sends a login message to the
server. To generate the login message, user initiates login message by inputting his
identity and password to the smart card. First, the smart card verifies the correctness of
input parameters. If verification fails, it terminates the session. Otherwise, it executes
the login session which works as follows:
Step 1. Compute a = L⊕h(IDi⊕PWi) then verify V =? h(IDi||a||PWi). If verification
does not hold, terminate the session. Otherwise, goto Step 2.
Step 2. Compute W = h(PWi||a) and then Xi = B ⊕W .
Step 3. Select a random number α ∈ Z∗q and compute Di = h(IDi)α mod p and M1 =
h(IDi||Di||Xi).
Step 4. Send the login message < NID,Di,M1 > to S.
4.4 Authenticated key agreement phase
Upon receiving user’s login request, the server verifies the authenticity of the message.
If verification succeeds, it responses with a valid message. Moreover, user also verify
the authenticity of the server. On the success of mutual authenticity, user and server
compute the session key and verify it. The detailed description of mutual authentication
and session key establishment is as follows:
Step 1. Upon receiving the message < NID,Di,M1 >, S checks the value NID in
users’ record table. If NID does not exist, it denies the request. Otherwise, it
extracts the values N, IDSC and IDi corresponding to NID from its database.
Figure 2: The pictorial representation of login and authentication phase
It calculates Xi = h(IDi||N ||IDSC ||x), then verifies M1 =? h(IDi||Di||Xi). If
verification does not hold, it denies the login request. Otherwise, S chooses a
random number β ∈ Z∗q and computes DS = h(IDi)β mod p, KS = (Di)β mod p =
h(IDi)
αβ mod p and the session key SKS = h(IDi||KS||Xi).
Step 2. S computes M2 = h(IDi||SKS||Di||DS) and sends the response message <
DS,M2 > to U .
Step 3. Upon receiving the message < DS,M2 >, U computes Ki = (DS)
α mod p =
h(IDi)
βα mod p and the session key SKi = h(IDi||Ki||Xi) and then verifies M2 =
? h(IDi||SKi||Di||DS). If verification does not hold, the session is terminated.
Otherwise, the server is authenticated and session key is verified.
Step 4. U computes M3 = h(IDi||SKi||Ki||DS) and sends < M3 > to S.
Step 5. Upon receiving the message < M3 >, S verifies M3 =? h(IDi||SKS||KS||DS). If
verification does not hold, the session is terminated. Otherwise, U is authenticated
and session key is verified.
4.5 Password Change Phase
The proposed scheme presents user-friendly password change phase where a user with
correct identity and password can change the password without server assistance. The
proposed password change phase, first verifies the correctness of input parameters (iden-
tity and password). If verification does not succeed, it terminate the session. Otherwise,
it executes the password change phase. The description of password change phase is as
follows:
Step 1. U inserts his smart card into the card reader and inputs identity IDi, old
password PWi and a new password PWnew.
Step 2. The smart card computes a = L ⊕ h(IDi ⊕ PWi) and then verifies V =
? h(IDi||a||PWi). If verification does not succeed, it terminates the session. Oth-
erwise, run Step P3.
Step 3. The smart card computes W = h(PWi||a) and Wnew = h(PWnew||a) then
Bnew = Bi⊕W ⊕Wnew, Lnew = a⊕h(IDi⊕PWnew) and Vnew = h(IDi||a||PWnew).
Then, it replaces B with Bnew, L with Lnew and V with Vnew.
Figure 3: The pictorial representation of password change phase
4.6 Smart card revocation
If a legal user lost his smart card, then user can get a new smart card from the server as
follows:
Step 1. U chooses a password PW ′i and a random number a
′ then computes W ′ =
h(PW ′i ||a′). He submits his new smart card request with IDi and W ′ to S via
secure channel.
Step 2. Upon receiving the request, S verifies the registration of U . If U ’s identity IDi
does not exist in server’s registered user’s list, it terminates the session. Otherwise,
it achieves N corresponding to IDi.
Step 3. S takesN = N+1 and select ID′SC andNID
′ then computesX ′i = h(IDi||N ||ID′SC ||x)
and B′ = X ′i +W
′.
Step 4. S personalizes U ’s smart card by embedding the security parameters {NID′, B′, h(·), p, q}
into the smart card and provides it to U via secure channel. S also updates N with
N+1 and adds the entry (N ||ID′SC ||IDi) corresponding to NID′ into users’ record
table.
Step 5. Upon receiving the smart card, U performs the Step 4 of registration phase.
Figure 4: The pictorial representation of revocation phase
5 Analysis
5.1 Security analysis
The detailed security analysis of the proposed scheme to verify ‘how the scheme satisfying
the security requirements’ is as follows:
5.1.1 User anonymity
The login message and smart card keeps dynamic identity NID which is a random value.
So, no information can be collected about IDi using NID. Moreover, an adversary may
try to guess IDi using the conditions V = h(IDi||a||PWi) or M1 = h(IDi||Di||Xi).
However, the identity guessing cannot succeeded because of the following facts:
• To verify the guessed identity ID∗i with V = h(IDi||a||PWi), a is needed. Although
to compute a from L = a ⊕ h(IDi ⊕ PWi), the password PWi is needed. The
password is only known to the user.
• To verify the guessed identity ID∗i with M1 = h(IDi||Di||Xi), the user’s secret key
Xi is needed. To extract IDi from B = Xi ⊕W , it requires user’s password PWi
as W = h(PWi ⊕ a).
5.1.2 Insider attack
The user submits W to the server instead of PWi, where W = h(PWi ⊕ a). Therefore,
an insider cannot achieve consumer password as hash function is one way. Moreover, an
adversary cannot guess the password using W = h(PWi ⊕ a) as user does not submit
random value a to the server.
5.1.3 Stolen smart card attack
Let the lost or stolen smart card of a user is achieved by an adversary. The adversary
can retrieve the parameters {NID,B, L, V } from the smart card and may try to use this
information to login to the server. However, this attempt cannot be succeeded in the
proposed scheme which is justified as follows:
• To generate a valid login message < NID,Di,M1 >, an adversary has to compute
M1 = h(IDi||Di||Xi).
• To compute M1, the user’s secret key Xi and identity IDi are needed.
• Neither the smart card nor the transmitted messages includes IDi. To compute Xi
from B, password is needed. Therefore, an adversary cannot achieve IDi and Xi.
Since the password is only known to the user and the identity is secret, an adversary
cannot generate a valid login message using stolen smart card. This shows that the
proposed scheme withstands stolen smart card attack.
5.1.4 Off-line password guessing attack
An adversary may try to guess user’s password. To guess the password, he can retrieve
the information NID, B = Xi ⊕W , L = a ⊕ h(IDi ⊕ PWi) and V = h(IDi||a||PWi)
from the smart card using power analysis attack [10]. Then, an adversary may try to
guess password as follows:
• The adversary guesses the password PW ∗.
• To verify the guessed password PW ∗ with the condition V =? h(IDi||a||PW ∗i ),
requires user’s identity IDi.
• Neither the smart card stores IDi nor any transmitted message.
• To guess the password, an adversary has to guess user’s identity IDi.
• If IDi is of n characters, then the probability to guess a correct n characters of IDi
is approximately 1/26n.
• If the password is of m characters, then the probability to guess of IDi and PWi
at the same time is approximately 1/26n+6m.
The above discussion shows that an adversary has to guess both identity and password
at the same time. Since, it is computationally infeasible to guess both value at the same
time as probability approximated to 1/26n+6m, the proposed scheme resists password
guessing attack.
5.1.5 On-line password guessing attack
An active adversary may try to verify guessed password by generating valid login mes-
sage. To generate valid login message, an adversary may use the retrieved information
{NID,B, L, V } from the smart card, and intercepted previously transmitted login mes-
sages < NID,Di,M1 >. However, the adversary cannot create a valid login message to
verify the guessed password. It is justified from the following discussion:
• Let the adversary guess the password PW ∗i .
• To verify the guessed password PW ∗, an adversary tries to generate a valid login
message < NID,D∗i ,M
∗
1 >, where D
∗
i = h(IDi)
e mod p and M∗1 = h(IDi||D∗i ||X∗i )
for a random value e. It is equivalent to achieve Xi from B = Xi⊕W using guessed
password, where W = h(PWi ⊕ a) and a = L⊕ h(IDi ⊕ PWi).
• To compute a, the IDi is needed along with PWi as a = L⊕ h(IDi ⊕ PWi).
• To compute M∗1 = h(IDi||D∗i ||Xi), user’s identity IDi is also needed.
• Neither the smart card nor the transmitted messages include IDi. Therefore, an
adversary has to guess identity along with password at the same time.
• To perform on-line password guessing attack, an adversary has to guess both iden-
tity and password at the same time. As we already discussed that it is infeasible.
It is clear from the discussion that an adversary cannot successfully perform on-line
password guessing attack.
5.1.6 Replay attack
An adversary can eavesdrop user’s communication, and can intercept and record old
transmitted messages < NID,Di,M1 >, < DS,M2 > and < M3 >. Then, he can try to
replay the old login message.
• Let adversary replay the message < NID,Di,M1 >.
• Upon receiving the message < NID,Di,M1 >, S checks the value NID in users’
record table and finds it as adversary repeats user’s valid message. It extracts
the values N, IDSC , IDi corresponding to NID from its database. It computes
Xi = h(IDi||N ||IDSC ||x) and verifies M1 =? h(IDi||Di||Xi). The verification
succeeds.
• S chooses a random number β′ ∈ Z∗q and computes D′S = h(IDi)β′ mod p, K ′S =
(Di)
β′ mod p, SK ′S = h(IDi||K ′S||Xi) and M ′2 = h(IDi||SK ′S||Di||D′S), then sends
the message < D′S,M
′
2 > to U .
• The adversary intercepts the message < D′S,M ′2 > and try to respond.
• If adversary respond with the old transmitted message < M3 >, where M3 =
h(IDi||SKi||Ki||DS) and Ki = (DS)α mod p = h(IDi)βα mod p. The server
identify the replay attack as β′ 6= β
• An adversary may also try to respond with < M ′3 >. To compute M ′3, an adversary
has to compute K ′i = h(IDi)
β′α mod p as M ′3 = h(IDi||SK ′i||K ′i||D′S).
• To computeK ′i = h(IDi)β′α mod p fromDi = h(IDi)α mod p andD′S = h(IDi)β′ mod p
is equivalent to Computational DiffieHellman (CDH) problem which is hard.
• Since the adversary cannot respond with the valid message, the server terminates
the session.
5.1.7 User impersonation attack
An adversary can masquerade as a legitimate user by successfully login to the server.
However, the proposed scheme can resist this attack as follows:
• An adversary may try to login to the server using replay attack. Although the
proposed scheme resist replay attack.
• An adversary mat try to generate a valid login message < NID,D′i,M ′1 > for a
random value e, where D′i = h(IDi)
e mod p and M1 = h(IDi||D′i||Xi). However,
an adversary cannot compute Di and M1 correctly as he cannot achieve IDi and
Xi. It is justified as follows:
− To compute M1, Xi and IDi are needed as M1 = h(IDi||D′i||Xi).
− Neither the smart card nor the transmitted messages includes IDi. So, an
adversary cannot achieve IDi.
− To compute Xi from B, the password is needed. Since the password is only
known to the user, an adversary cannot achieve Xi.
This shows that the proposed scheme resists user impersonation attack.
5.1.8 Server impersonation attack
An adversary can masquerade as a server and try to respond with valid message to the
user as follows:
• When an user sends a login message < NID,D′i,M ′1 > to the server, the adversary
intercept the message, where D′i = h(IDi)
α′ mod p and M ′1 = h(IDi||D′i||Xi).
• An adversary may try to respond using old message of server < DS,M2 >, where
M2 = h(IDi||SKS||Di||DS), Di = h(IDi)α mod p, DS = h(IDi)β mod p, KS =
h(IDi)
αβ mod p and SKS = h(IDi||KS||Xi). However, the user can identity the
replay of old message as follows:
− Upon receiving the message< DS,M2 >, the user computesK ′i = (DS)α′ mod p =
h(IDi)
βα′ mod p and the session key SK ′i = h(IDi||K ′i||Xi)
− The user verifies M2 =? h(IDi||SK ′U ||D′i||DS). The verification does not hold
as α′ 6= α and so K ′i 6= KS and D′i 6= Di.
• An adversary may try to generate the valid login message < DE,M∗2 > for a
random value e, where DE = h(IDi)
e mod p, M∗2 = h(IDi||SKE||D′i||DE) and
SKE = h(IDi||KE||Xi). However, an adversary cannot compute M∗2 correctly due
to the following facts:
− To computeM∗2 = h(IDi||SKE||D′i||DE), an adversary has to compute SKE =
h(IDi||KE||Xi).
− To compute SKE, Xi and IDi are needed.
− Neither the smart card nor the transmitted messages includes IDi. So, an
adversary cannot achieve IDi.
− To compute Xi from B, the password is needed. Since the password is only
known to the user, an adversary cannot achieve Xi.
This shows that the proposed scheme resists server impersonation attack.
5.1.9 Time synchronization problem
Deploying the timestamp method to resist the replay attack, requires the cost of im-
plementing clock synchronization, that is, the clock time of the all the registered users
and the server must not fluctuate out of a small range. To overcome this problem, the
proposed scheme uses random number instead of timestamp to verify the freshness of
message.
5.1.10 Mutual authentication
The server verifies the authenticity of user with the condition M1 =? h(IDi||Di||Xi).
Since to compute M1, user’s identity IDi and secret key Xi is needed, therefore, the server
can correctly verify the user’s authenticity as adversary cannot achieve IDi and Xi. The
user verifies the authenticity of user with the condition M2 =? h(IDi||SKS||Di||DS),
where SKS = h(IDi||KS||Xi). Since no unauthorized party can compute SKS =
h(IDi||KS||Xi) as it requires IDi and Xi. So, the user can correctly verify the server
authenticity.
5.1.11 Session Key agreement
The user and the server compute the session keys SKi = h(IDi||Ki||Xi) and SKS =
h(IDi||KS||Xi), respectively. The computed session keys SKi and SKS are same at both
ends as
KS = (Di)
β mod p
= h(IDi)
αβ mod p
= h(IDi)
βα mod p
= (DS)
α mod p
= Ki
5.1.12 Session key verification
The user verifies whether the server has computed the session key correctly using the
condition M2 = h(IDi||SKS||Di||DS). The server verifies whether the user has computed
the session key correctly using the condition M3 = h(IDi||SKi||Ki||DS). Since, both M2
and M3 include the session key, the user and the server can correctly verify the established
session key.
5.1.13 Key freshness
Each session key SKS = h(IDi||KS||Xi), where KS = h(IDi)αβ mod p, involves random
numbers α and β. The random values α and β are fresh for each session. Uniqueness of
these values for each session, guaranties the unique key for each session. The unique key
construction for each session ensures the key freshness property.
5.1.14 known key secrecy
If the previously established session key SKS = SKi = h(IDi||KS||Xi) is compromised,
then the compromised session key reveals no information about other session keys due
to following reasons:
• Each key is hashed with one way hash function, therefore, no information can be
retrieve from the session key.
• Each session key involves random numbers which guarantees different key for each
session.
Since no information about other established session keys from the compromised session
key is extracted. This shows that proposed scheme achieves known key secrecy.
5.1.15 Forward secrecy
Forward secrecy states that compromise of user long-term secret key does not become
the reason to compromise of established session keys. In proposed scheme, if the user
long-term secret key Xi is compromised, then an adversary cannot compute the session
key as he cannot achieve IDi and cannot compute h(IDi)
αβ mod p which is justified as
follows:
• Neither the smart card nor the transmitted messages include IDi, therefore, an
adversary can not achieve IDi.
• To compute h(IDi)αβ mod p from Di = (IDi)α mod p and (IDi)β mod p is equiva-
lent to computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. Since CDH problem is hard,
therefore, no unauthorized user can compute KS or Ki using Di and DS.
5.1.16 Perfect forward secrecy
In perfect forward secrecy scenario, an adversary cannot compute the session key with
the compromised master key of the server. Although if the server master key x is com-
promised, an adversary may compute the user’s secret key Xi = h(IDi||N ||IDSC ||x), but
he cannot compute the session key which is justified as follows:
• To compute the session key h(IDi||KS||Xi), an adversary has to compute KS =
h(IDi)
αβ mod p.
• To compute h(IDi)αβ mod p using Di = (IDi)α mod p and (IDi)β mod p is
equivalent to computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. Since CDH problem
is hard, therefore, an adversary cannot compute h(IDi)
αβ mod p using Di and DS.
Since, the compromised of master key does not mean compromised of session key, it
shows that proposed scheme ensures perfect forward secrecy.
5.1.17 Known session-specific temporary information attack
If the short-term keys or temporary secrets, say, β and α are compromised, then an
attacker may try to construct the session key SKS = SKi = h(IDi||KS||Xi) using β
and α. Because, to compute the session key user’s identity IDi and Xi are needed along
with β or α. Since neither smart card stores IDi nor transmitted messages associate it.
Additionally, the user secret key Xi is protected with password. An adversary cannot
achieve IDi and Xi. This shows that the proposed scheme resists Known session-specific
temporary information attack.
5.1.18 Efficient login phase
In the proposed scheme, smart cards can correctly identify the incorrect input as follows:
Case-1. If the smart card receives incorrect password PW ∗i instead of PWi then
• The smart card retrieves a∗ = L⊕h(IDi⊕PW ∗i ) and verifies Vi =?h(IDi||a∗||PW ∗i ).
• The verification does not hold as V = h(IDi||a||PWi) and PWi 6= PW ∗i .
Case-2. If the smart card receives incorrect identity ID∗i then
• The smart card retrieves a′∗ = L⊕h(ID∗i⊕PWi) and verifies Vi =?h(ID∗i ||a′∗||PWi).
• The verification does not hold as V = h(IDi||a||PWi) and ID∗i 6= IDi.
Case-3. If the smart card receives incorrect identity ID∗i and password PW
∗
i then
• The smart card retrieves a′′∗ = L⊕h(ID∗i⊕PW ∗i ) and verifies Vi =?h(ID∗i ||a′′∗||PW ∗i ).
• The verification does not hold as V = h(IDi||a||PWi), ID∗i 6= IDi and PWi 6=
PW ∗i .
In all the above cases the smart card can detect the incorrect input. This shows that
proposed scheme has efficient login phase.
5.1.19 User-friendly and efficient password changes phase
The user is allowed to change his password without server assistance. This makes pro-
posed scheme user-friendly. Moreover, the smart card verifies the correctness of identity
and password using the condition V =? h(IDi||a||PWi). If the verification does not suc-
ceed, the smart card terminates the session. Otherwise, it allows to change the password.
Since the smart card can verify the correctness of input efficiently, a user can change his
password correctly without any mistake.
The comparison of proposed scheme with Xu et al.’s, Song’s, Sood et al.’s, Chen et al.’s
and Li et al.s’ schemes is presented in Table-1. If the scheme prevent attack or satisfies
the attribute, the symbol (
√
) is used. otherwise, the symbol (×) is used.
5.2 Performance analysis
In general, the smart cards have limited storage space and computation capacity. There-
fore, the authentication protocol must give priority to the efficiency due to resource
constraints in smart card [9]. In this section, we show the efficiency analysis of proposed
schemes with similar password based remote user authentication protocols based on smart
card. Let Th, TE, TM , TS and TX denote the time complexity of hash function, expo-
nential operation, multiplication/division operation, symmetric encryption/decryption
operation and XOR operation, respectively. It is well known that the time complexity
of XOR operation is negligible as compared to two other operations. So, we do not take
TX into account. In general, the time complexity associated with Th, TE and TX can be
more or less expressed as TE >> Th >> TX [11, 15].
Table 1: Comparison of the proposed scheme with related schemes for different desirable
security attributeshhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhSecurity attributes
Schemes
[16] [13] [14] [1] [3] Proposed
User anonymity × × × × × √
Insider Attack × × × × × √
On-line password guessing attack × × × × × √
Off-line password guessing attack × × × × × √
Forward secrecy
√ × √ √ √ √
Known session keys attack
√ √ √ √ √ √
User impersonation attack × × × × × √
Server impersonation attack
√ × √ × √ √
Replay attack
√ √ √ √ √ √
Time synchronization problem × × × × × √
Mutual authentication
√ √ × √ √ √
Efficient login phase × × × × √ √
Efficient password change phase
√ √ √ √ √ √
User-friendly password change phase × × × × × √
Session key agreement
√ √ √ √ √ √
Session key verification × × × × × √
Smart card revocation × × × × × √
Table 2: Computation cost comparison of proposed scheme with related schemes
Schemes Registration Login Authentication Password change
Xu et al. TE + 2Th 3Th + 2TE 6Th + 2TE 7Th + 4TE
Song TE + 2Th 2Th + 1TS 6Th + 1TS + 1TE 8Th + 2TS + 1TE
Sood et al. 2TE + Th 2Th + 2TM + 3TE 4Th + 1TM + 2TE 4Th + 5TM + 7TE
Chen et al. Th + TE 2Th + 2TM + 2TE 6Th + 1TM + 1TE 6Th + 5TM + 5TE
Jiang et al. Th + TE 2Th + TM + 3TE 6Th + 2TE 6Th + 3TM + 7TE
Proposed 4Th 4Th + TE 8Th + 3TE 6Th
6 Conclusion
The presented article analyzes Jiang et al.’s scheme and demonstrates the weakness
of their schemes. This investigation shows that their scheme is vulnerable to on-line
and off-line password guessing attack, insider attack and user impersonation attack. It
also fails to protect anonymity and to present efficient login and use-friendly password
change phase. Further, we have presented an improved smart card based anonymous user
authentication scheme to remove all the drawbacks of Jiang et al.’s scheme. Moreover,
the proposed scheme present smart card revocation phase where a user can achieve lost
smart card with the help of server without registering again.
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